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ABSTRACT

The WTO system requires that trade restrictions meant to protect
health and safety be based on a risk assessment supported by "sufficient scientific evidence. " Scholars and internationalstandards organizations have pointed out, however, that science is incapable of
providing answers to questions of health and safety without incorporating the risk assessors' value judgments and assumptions. Before
GMO-importing countries conduct risk assessments, GMO-producing
and -exporting countries have already conducted their own risk assessments, which led to their decision to produce and market the products
in the first place. Both the exporting and importing countries' risk
assessments employ science informed by the risk assessors' value judgments and assumptions. Scrutinizing the exporting and importing
countries' risk assessments, and making their value judgments explicit
would level the playing field between GMO-producing and GMOimporting nations in the WTO. Instead of tacitly adopting the GMOproducing country's value judgments, GMO-importing countries
might highlight their distinct, but situationally appropriate,judgments,
and defend their risk assessments as supported by scientific evidence
informed by those context-appropriatejudgments.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Risk assessment of biotechnology products ("GMOs" 1 ) occurs on two

fronts. First, countries conduct risk assessments to determine whether to
permit the development, planting, harvesting and marketing of GMOs.
Second, countries conduct risk assessments to determine whether to
block or restrict the import of GMOs based on potential harm to human
health or the environment. While these trade-restricting risk assessments
have been the subject of considerable scrutiny in the WTO and of debate
in legal scholarship,' the first-order risk assessments - those that result in
1 "GMO," an acronym for "genetically modified organism," technically describes

products that have been genetically modified by any method, including traditional
breeding methods as well as modern biotechnology. According to conventional
practice, however, this article uses the term "GMO" to refer to products modified by
means of biotechnology.
2 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Suspension of
Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008)
[hereinafter US-Continued Suspension], available at http://tiny.cc/mhqdt; Appellate
Body Report, Japan-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/
R (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Japan-Apples], available at http://tiny.cc/9n8f0;
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998)
[hereinafter EC-Hormones]; Panel Report, European Communities-Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/
R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 9, 2006) [hereinafter EC-Biotech], available at http://tiny.cc/
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products being developed and introduced into international trade in the
first place - have been largely overlooked in the debate over international trade of GMOs.
Social science and legal scholars have argued that risk assessments are
not the neutral exercise of "sound science," as often characterized by the
WTO; rather, they are inherently shaped by the risk assessors' value judgments.' These scholars have called for the WTO to protect its legitimacy
by using a "sliding scale" to allow countries to take a more precautionary
(i.e., trade restrictive) approach where, as in the case of GMOs, there is
low certainty about the relevant information and analytical methods, and
low consensus about the framing of the scientific issues and the values to
be protected.4
While this proposal is sensible, it does not strike at the root of the legitimacy crisis in the international treatment of GMOs. The problem begins
at the domestic level, when a country decides - based on its own risk
assessment - to develop and market GMOs domestically and internationally. Once these products are in the stream of international commerce,
countries that wish to reject or restrict them are on the defensive. At
best, they may attempt to control these products' entry through trade
barriers, but such trade barriers may be (and have been) subject to WTO
dispute proceedings.' In a WTO proceeding, the trade-restricting party
must introduce and defend its risk assessment - but the exporting party's
own risk assessment (which adjudged the products safe enough to produce and market) is not similarly scrutinized or compared.6 The deck is
stacked against the more precautionary party by the time the issue even
reaches the WTO.

p5g8p; Ilona Cheyne, Precaution in International Trade in Food and Other
Agricultural Products, 4 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 47 (2009); Robert Howse,
Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade
Organization,98 MIcH. L. REV. 2329 (2000); Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation,
Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 353 (2002).
3

See, e.g.,

CONRAD BRUNK ET AL., VALUE ASSUMPTIONS IN RISK ASSESSMENT:

CASE STUDY OF THE ALACHLOR CONTROVERSY

A

(Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press 1991);

Vern R. Walker, The Myth of Science as a "Neutral Arbiter" for Triggering
Precautions, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 197 (2003) [hereinafter Walker, The

Myth of Science]; Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "'World
Trans-Sciencescience Organization": Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and

Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251 (1998);
David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 81 (2005).
1 See, e.g., Winickoff, supra note 3, at 107-22.
1 See, e.g., EC-Biotech, supra note 2.
6 Id.
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Moreover, a WTO panel declined to adopt the sliding-scale approach
in the EC-Biotech case,7 and a country may lose the battle to reject or
restrict GMOs while the international legal squabbles continue. GMOs
are difficult or impossible to distinguish from non-GMO counterparts
without laboratory testing and have a tendency to contaminate nonGMO seeds, fields and harvests with which they come into contact.8
Dozens of cases exist in which GMOs were discovered in countries and in
streams of commerce for which they were not approved by law.9 In short,
by the time one country has made the decision that GMOs are safe for
production and consumption, that decision carries a de facto presumption
of legitimacy in international trade, due to both the realities of trade dispute resolution and the uncontrollability of plant pollen and seed in the
wild.
The United States is the world's largest producer and exporter of
GMOs.1 ° The decision to approve the development, planting and mar7 EC-Biotech, supra note 2. Scholars, as amicus curiae,submitted this argument to

the Panel in EC-Biotech. Amicus Curiae Submission from Lawrence Busch et al.,
European Communities-MeasuresAffecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
http://tiny.cc/6668g. The Panel declined to follow the analysis suggested by the
Amicus.
8 See generally MARGARET MELLON & JANE RISSLER, GONE TO SEED:
IN THE TRADITIONAL SEEDS SUPPLY 7 (Union of
Concerned Scientists 2004) (reporting results of tests indicating that commercial crop
DNA was found in corn, soybean, and canola seeds), availableat http://tiny.cc/m02x7;
Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), Adventitious Presence, http://tiny.cc/
25zvr (discussing adventitious presence, or the accidental "commingling of trace
amounts of one type of seed ... with another" and its inevitability).
I See, e.g., GREENPEACE INT'L, GM CONTAMINATION REGISTER REPORT (2007).
10 In 2009, 134 million hectares of biotechnology crops were planted, nearly half
(64 million) in the United States. See Global Status of Commercialized GMO/
Biotech Crops: 2009, available at http://tiny.cc/tirhv. The United States planted more
than twice as many hectares to biotech crops as the next largest adopting countries,
Brazil and Argentina, which planted 21.4 and 21.3 million hectares, respectively. Id.
Large scale commercial planting of biotech crops began in 1996, with 1.66 million
hectares of biotech crops. Graham Brookes & Peter Barfoot, International Service
for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, GM Crops: The First 10 Years Global Socio-Economic and Environmental Impacts at 2 (2006), available at http://
tiny.cc/a3tfj. The period between 1996 and 1999 saw a twentyfold increase in hectares
planted to biotech products, or nearly 40 hectares. Simonetta Zarrilli, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, International Trade in Genetically Modified
Organisms and MultilateralNegotiations, 5, U.N.Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/1 (Jul.
5, 2000) [hereinafter Zarrilli], available at http://tiny.cc/dniri. Nearly all of those
hectares planted were in the United States, Argentina, or Canada; 72% of them were
in the United States. Id. at 6. By 2005, Brazil and China had joined the list of
countries planting significant shares of biotech crops. Brookes & Barfoot, supra note
10, at 2. More than 87 million hectares of crops with biotech traits were planted in
TRANSGENIC CONTAMINANTS
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keting of these products was made by the executive branch in the late
1980s and early 1990s. This risk assessment was presented in public documents as a product of objective scientific observation. As other scholars
have argued, however, all risk assessments are shaped by values and culturally-specific framing of the scientific issues. This applies equally to the
U.S.'s initial risk assessment to develop and market the products as to the
E.U.'s decision to restrict their import.
Within the U.S. itself, the failure to acknowledge the cultural and situational particularity of any risk assessment has begun to meet with challenges. In Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns," a federal district court held
that the USDA could not deregulate GMO alfalfa without consideration
of biodiversity impacts, even though the USDA had determined that
GMO alfalfa was not toxic to humans or animals.' 2 In other words, a risk
assessment is particular to its context, not a "yay" or "nay" question that
may simply be answered once and applied by rote to all policy goals.
While GMO trade and contamination are already the reality, the recognition of the specificity of the U.S.'s risk assessment, and its de facto
presumption of legitimacy in international GMO trade, is more than
mere spilt milk. For advocates working toward protection of national
choice to reject or restrict GMOs, addressing the root of the problem may
offer strategic advantages not posed by focusing entirely on the WTO.
Because of the political and biological realities of GMO trade, the greatest hope for protecting a precautionary approach toward GMOs in
importing countries is to create pressure toward a more precautionary
approach in the GMOs' countries of origin. Products that are carefully
regulated at home can be more easily regulated in trade. The Geertson
case illustrates that there is already political pressure from within the U.S.
to take a closer look at GMOs."3 If advocates focus on revealing the
values inherent in the U.S.'s own initial risk assessment, the political process within the U.S. may result in a clearer acknowledgment of those values and a more candid framing of the scientific issues in various contexts
for which risks of GMOs are assessed domestically.
Second, these arguments may also be employed within WTO proceedings as a means of highlighting the de facto preference given to the risk
assessment of the U.S. (or other exporting country) as opposed to that of
the importing party, regardless of any standard of review employed by
2005. Id. By 2007, the global market value of biotech crops was estimated at $6.9
billion USD, or 16 percent of the global crop protection market and 20 percent of the
global commercial seed market. Id.
11 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007).
12

Id.

The court's reasoning in Geertson has been followed in a subsequent case
involving deregulation of genetically modified sugar beets. See Center for Food
Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N. D. Calif. Sep. 21, 2009).
13
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the WTO itself. Countries defending GMO trade restrictions on these
grounds might frame their argument based on harm to sovereignty rather
than to health or the environment. 4 Even a sympathetic review of this
argument by a WTO body might become a political tool to hasten the
ongoing domestic political process in the U.S. of reconsidering the executive's initial risk assessment on GMOs.
Section II of this Article considers the limits of scientific neutrality in
GMO risk assessments and the inherent role of nation-specific value
judgments and assumptions in framing any risk assessment. Applying
these concepts to a case study of GMO risk assessment in the U.S., Section III considers a 1992 policy statement by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") that stated that new GMO products were presumed to
be "generally recognized as safe," ("GRAS"), and therefore not subject
to premarket review (i.e., product-by-product risk assessment). This section takes a closer look at the scientific basis for the policy statement and
concludes that, for reasons both factual and logical, scientific principles
alone could not account for the policy arrived at by FDA. Something else
- the value judgments and assumptions involved in framing - informed
the outcome of the risk assessment.
Section IV compares the process of framing in the U.S. and in other
countries. Since framing decisions are dependent on economic, legal, cultural, social and political, as well as scientific context, it follows that those
framing decisions will not be, and should not be, identical for each country. This situational particularity of framing gives rise to legitimacy concerns for an international trade system that scrutinizes the risk
assessments of import-restricting countries without expressly considering
the role of nation-specific value judgments and assumptions, and without
considering whether the producing and exporting country's framing decisions can be appropriately applied to the importing country.
Section V examines the Geertson decision's holding that risk assessments are dependent upon the specific context in which they occur and
the specific harm sought to be prevented. Finally, Section VI returns to
the role of scientific evidence in risk assessments before the WTO, concluding that science may still play a viable role in harmonizing trade laws
and preventing the use of health and safety measures as a pretext for
protectionism. At the same time, the WTO may achieve greater legitimacy by scrutinizing importing and exporting countries' scientific evidence in light of the value judgments and assumptions, appropriate to
each country, that framed each country's risk assessment.

14 This argument was developed in Alison Peck, The New Imperialism: Toward an

Advocacy Strategy for GMO Accountability, 21 GEO. INT'L ENv'T L. REV. 37 (2008).
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II.

FRAMING AND VALUES IN U.S. RISK ASSESSMENTS:
Tm LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC NEUTRALITY

In the WTO framework, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures' 5 requires that any trade-restricting measures designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health must be
based on "scientific principles" and may not be maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence."' 6 The agreement also requires that the measures be based on "an assessment of the risks" to human, animal or plant
life or health, and that such risk assessments accord with "risk assessment
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations."' 7 This
focus on scientific evidence has motivated much of the WTO's analysis of
risk assessments used to support trade-restricting health and safety laws
("SPS measures"), 8 including a WTO Panel's rejection of GMO import
restrictions set by the European Community and some of its member
states in EC-Biotech.19
Despite this focus on objective scientific evidence as a basis for SPS
measures, international food safety organizations and social science
scholars have sought to make clear that science cannot provide a valueneutral, one-size-fits-all source of decisional principles on which to
uphold or strike down SPS measures.2 ° Instead, the process of risk
15 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
THE LEGAL TEXTS:
TRADE

THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL

NEGOTIATIONS

59 (2007) (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS

Agreement], available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf.
16 "Members shall ensure that any [SPS] measure is applied only to the extent
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as
provided for in [Art. 5.7]." Id. art. 2.2. The exception in Art. 5.7 also emphasizes the
role of scientific evidence:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt [SPS] measures on the basis of available pertinent
information, including that from the relevant international organizations as well
as from [SPS] measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances,
Members shall seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk and review the [SPS] measure accordingly within a
reasonable period of time."
Id. art. 5.7.
17 Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement provides, "Members shall ensure that their [SPS]
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks
to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment
techniques developed by the relevant international organizations." Id. art. 5.1.
18 See US-Continued Suspension, supra note 2; Japan-Apples, supra note 2; ECHormones, supra note 2; EC-Biotech, supra note 2.
19 EC-Biotech, supra note 2.
20 See, e.g., Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), FAO
Expert Consultation on Food Safety: Science and Ethics (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter
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assessment, even if based on sound science, requires risk assessors to
make value judgments.2 1 Those judgments may be influenced by economic, legal, cultural, social or environmental values as well as scientific
principles.2 2
In an effort to guide decision making and bring greater transparency to
these necessary value judgments in the field of food safety, the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, together with the World
Health Organization, convened an "Expert Consultation on Food Safety:
Science and Ethics."23 In its report, the FAO addressed the misperception that science might provide an entirely value-neutral framework for
risk assessments:
Codex [Alimentarius Commission] policies emphasize that risk analysis should be based upon risk assessment as a scientific enterprise.
Since the relationship between science and ethics is a crucial element
of risk analysis, we need to clarify what is meant by "scientific." If
scientific is taken to mean rigorous, impartial and with interpersonal
objectivity, then this is a good description of the standard for which
risk assessment should strive. If scientific is meant to imply "value
free" and providing the only "right" answers in the identification,
assessment and management of risks, then this is plainly wrong.
Implicit in risk analysis are some - mostly uncontroversial - value
judgements, which merit further analysis.24
The FAO delineated a range of value judgments and policy choices that
must be made by scientific risk assessors in selecting data samples, methodologies and assumptions to be used in the risk assessment.2 5 For
example:
* Risk assessors must choose whether to confine the hazards identified
to mortality and morbidity (illness) due to known toxicity or disease,
or to include less well-characterized or even unknown and unforeseen outcomes. The FAO emphasized that people who see little benFAO], available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/O776e/O776eOO.pdf; Walker, The
Myth of Science, supra note 3; Vern R. Walker, The Siren Songs of Science: Toward a
Taxonomy of Scientific Uncertaintyfor Decisionmakers,23 CONN. L. REV. 567 (1991)
[hereinafter Walker, Siren Songs]; Winickoff et al., supra note 3; see also Codex
Alimentarius Commission, Report of the Twenty-Sixth Session, Rome, Italy, June 30July 7, 2003, Appendix IV: Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in
the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, 25, availableat http://www.fao.org/DOC
REP/006/Y4800E/y4800eOo.htm#bm24 ("The report of the risk assessment should
indicate any constraints, uncertainties, assumptions and their impact on the risk
assessment. Minority opinions should also be recorded.").
21 See FAO, supra note 20, at v; Winickoff, supra note 3, at 94.
22 FAO, supra note 20, at vi.
23 Id. at v.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 17-20.
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efit from the technology or product at issue may favor a broader
definition of hazards;26
" Risk assessors must make the assumption that hazards to the population studied can be extrapolated to the population actually exposed
(such as extrapolating from animal studies to human populations or
from studies based on human populations in wealthy countries to
those in less developed countries);2 7
" Risk assessors must estimate exposure based on assumptions about
whether best practice and the intended use of the product realistically reflect actual exposure. The FAO cited the example of whether
to assess risk relative to all genetically modified foods, though many
are never developed, or only those intended for food and not animal
feed, although food contamination may occur, or some other
assumption.2
Social scientists use the term "framing" to define this process of making value judgments and assumptions that influence the outcome of a risk
assessment.2 9 Frames are "principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens,
and what matters."3 The value judgments and policy decisions used to
establish the frame for a risk assessment "are, by definition, non-scientific," 31 and critical to the outcome of the risk assessment. According to
the FAO, "[t]he reliability of a risk assessment is influenced by many factors, not the least of which are the appropriate framing of the questions
being asked and the relative completeness of the knowledge of the risk
assessors."32

III.

FRAMING IN

U.S.

BIOTECH RISK ASSESSMENT

The United States, as the largest producer and exporter of GMOs, is
responsible for the first-order risk assessments of the majority of GM
products on the international market. 33 Because those first-order risk
assessments are not subject to scrutiny in WTO controversies over GMO
trade restrictions, however, they have not been subject to the same rigorous analysis applied to risk assessments employed by nations instituting
SPS measures restricting GMOs.
26

Id. at 17-18.

27

Id. at 18.
Id.
See Winickoff, supra note 3, at 94; see generally DONALD A.

28
29

REIN, FRAME/REFLEcrION:

CONTROVERSIES (BasicBooks 1994).
30 TODD GITLIN, THE WHOLE WORLD IS WATCHING:
MAKING & UNMAKING OF THE NEW LEFT
31 Winickoff, supra note 3, at 95.

&

MARTIN

MASS

MEDIA

IN THE

6 (Univ. of California Press 1980).

FAO, supra note 20, at 6.
33 See infra notes 105-113 and accompanying text.
32

SCHON

TOWARD THE RESOLUTION OF INTRACTABLE POLICY
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This lack of scrutiny of first-order risk assessments is especially problematic in light of the recognition that all risk assessments are influenced
by the frames - that is, the value judgments, assumptions and policy decisions - made by the risk assessors. Those judgments are necessarily
linked to the risk assessors' economic, legal, social, cultural and environmental values 34 - values that other countries may not share.
A.

1984-1992: Establishing The Frame for GMO Risk Assessments in
the United States

In the United States, risk assessments on individual GMO products are
divided among three agencies: the FDA (food, feed, food additives, and
veterinary drugs), USDA (plant pests, plants, and veterinary biologic),
and the EPA (microbial/plant-pesticides, new uses of existing pesticides,
novel microorganisms). 35 As discussed below, those individual product
risk assessments - or, in some cases, decisions not to conduct risk assessments 6 - are "framed" by evolving agency policies, and by executive
branch policy statements produced during the early period of biotechnology commercialization in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Initially, the Reagan Administration charged the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") with drafting a federal
framework for food biotechnology.3 7 The OSTP's 1984 Coordinated
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology announced the policy that
products created by biotechnology were no different than other products,
and that existing statutes were sufficient to regulate biotechnology.3 8
After publication of the Coordinated Framework, the White House convened the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee ("BSCC"), an9
3
inter-agency committee responsible for coordination for science policy.
When the BSCC was unable to come to agreement, its working materials
were forwarded to the President's Council on Competitiveness, a proindustry council formed by President Bush and led by Vice President Dan
34 See FAO, supra note 20, at vi.
35 Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology Notice, 51 Fed.

Reg. 23,302, 23,304 (June 26, 1986) [hereinafter CoordinatedFramework].
36 See, e.g., infra notes 46-56 and accompanying text (foods derived from
biotechnology presumed to be "generally recognized as safe" and not normally
required to undergo pre-market review); Geertson, 2007 WL 518624 (reviewing
APHIS' determination of non-regulated status to biotech alfalfa without preparation
of Environmental Impact Statement).
31 Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49
Fed. Reg. 50,856-58,057 (Dec. 31, 1984).
38 Id. ("the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Food and Drug Administration intend to apply their existing regulatory
authorities to biotechnology products").
39 SHELDON KRIMSKY, BIOTECHNICS AND
GENETICS

197, 204 (Praegers Publishers 1991).

SOCIETY: THE RISE OF INDUSTRIAL
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Quayle. The Council on Competitiveness established an Ad Hoc Committee on Scope, which, together with the OSTP, established the scope of
agency jurisdiction over biotechnology.4 1
During its deliberation process, the OSTP proposed draft policy statements that indicated a goal to "minimize regulatory burden while assuring protection of public health and welfare," and to "accommodate the
rapid advances in biotechnology."4 2 These goals were facilitated by the
OSTP's perspective on risk: "Products developed through biotechnology
processes do not per se pose risks to human health and the environment;
risk depends
instead on the characteristics of use of the individual
43
products.

The OSTP published its Final Statement of Scope in 1992. The Final
Statement includes five policy principles underlying the Administration's
tenets regarding GM foods:
1. The same physical and biological laws govern the response of
organisms modified by modern molecular and cellular methods and
those produced by classical methods;
2. Information about the process used to produce a [GM] organism is ... not a useful criterion for determining whether the product

requires less or more oversight;
3. No conceptual distinction exists between genetic modification
of plants and microorganisms by classical methods or by molecular
techniques...
4. Crops modified by molecular and cellular methods should pose
risks no different from those modified by classical methods for similar traits ...

;[and]

5. In many respects, molecular methods resemble the classical
methods for modifying particular strains of microorganisms, but [are
even more useful than the classical methods] ..

.

Id.; see also Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on
Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 739-41 (2003).
41 See Principles for Federal Oversight of Biotechnology: Planned Introduction
into the Environment of Organisms with Modified Hereditary Traits, 55 Fed. Reg.
31,118, 31,119 (proposed Jul. 31, 1990) (describing participation of BSCC)
[hereinafter Proposed Statement of Scope]; see also KRIMSKY, supra note 39, at 197,
204; Marden, supra note 40, at 739-41.
42 Notice of Exercise of Federal Oversight Within Scope of Statutory Authority:
Planned Introductions of Biotechnology Products into the Environment, 57 Fed. Reg.
6753, 6760 (Feb. 27, 1992) [hereinafter, Final Statement of Scope].
40

43

Id.

44 Id. at 6755. For additional statements of the first Bush Administration's view of
risk and tenets of oversight, see PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
REPORT ON NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY

(1991).
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B.

The Effect of U.S. Risk Assessment Framing on Agency Oversight
of Biotech Products
These early statements of policy guide federal agencies' determinations
of whether a new biotech product should be subject to agency oversight
and risk assessment, and set the basic scope of any such risk assessment.
As such, they are the first step in the framing of U.S. agencies' decisions
whether to perform risk assessments on new biotech products. To look
more closely at the role of framing in U.S. risk assessments, this section
considers a particular case: the FDA's 1992 policy that new foods derived
from biotech plants are presumed to be GRAS under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act ("FFDCA").4 5
1. FDA 1992 GRAS Presumption for New Biotech Foods: Are
Biotech and Unmodified Plant Varieties Fungible?
In 1992, the FDA announced a policy that most new foods created
using biotechnology would not be subject to safety testing under the
FFDCA.46 The FFDCA requires that ingredients added to foods must be
approved by the FDA as food additives, unless they are GRAS. 7 In the
case of "traditional" foods, the burden is on the producer to establish that
novel food products are eligible to be treated as GRAS, or to go through
the process for approval of any new trait as a food additive. 48 In the case
of GM products, however, the FDA in 1992 announced a policy that most
GM products were presumed or likely to be GRAS, and therefore not
subject to food additive review. 41 The FDA stated that biotechnology
traits did not present safety concerns different from traditional plants and
thus could be presumed GRAS:
With respect to transferred genetic material (nucleic acids), generally
FDA does not anticipate that transferred genetic material would
itself be subject to food additive regulation. Nucleic acids are present in the cells of every living organism, including every plant and
animal used for food by humans or animals, and do not raise a safety
concern as a component of food. In regulatory terms, such material
is presumed to be GRAS.
...When the substance present in the food is one that is already
present at generally comparable or greater levels in currently con45 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301-399a (s)

(2006)
(requiring FDA approval for any substance used in food if it is not "generally
recognized" by experts as safe).
46 Notice of Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed.
Reg. 22,984 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter, 1992 FDA Policy].
47 21 U.S.C. § 321(s).
48 Id. § 348(b).
49 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990.
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sumed foods, there is unlikely to be a safety question sufficient to
call into question the presumed GRAS status of such naturally
occurring substances and thus warrant formal premarket review and
approval by FDA.5"
With its 1992 policy, the FDA expressly sought to articulate a policy
consistent with the goals articulated in the Administration's Final Statement of Scope. Those principles guided agency oversight by directing
that "[i]nformation about the process used to produce a [GM] organism is
•.. not a useful criterion for determining whether the product requires
less or more oversight," and that "[c]rops modified by molecular and cellular methods should pose risks no different from those modified by classical methods for similar traits."" In a memorandum describing the
policy, then-FDA Commissioner David Kessler stated, "[t]he approach
and provisions of the [FDA policy] are consistent with the general biotechnology policy established by the Office of the President in the
recently published 'scope' document."5 2 The policy referred to the Final
Statement of Scope's product-based focus by equating biotech and nonbiotech forms of genetic modification: "[m]odification" is used in a broad
context to mean the alteration in the composition of food that results
from adding, deleting or changing hereditary traits, irrespective of the
method."53 The policy emphasized its conformity with the product-based
Scope principle, stating that its focus in evaluating safety was on the
"characteristics of the food product, rather than the fact that the new
' 54
methods are used.
The 1992 FDA Policy is curious in that it departs from the FDA's longstanding policy with regard to novel food products. For new foods not
developed using biotechnology, the FDA has warned that food companies should not assume that an ingredient is GRAS simply because it is
present in food in other forms or in other countries. 5 5 The FDA has
never issued a presumption of GRAS status for new hybrids or other
novel food products created using traditional breeding methods, and 1992
FDA policy expressly applies that presumption only to products created
using biotechnology.5 6
50

Id.

Final Statement of Scope, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6755.
Memorandum from David Kessler, Commissioner of FDA, to the Secretary for
Health and Human Services (Mar. 20, 1992), http://www.biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/23/
kesslerp.pdf [hereinafter Kessler Memorandum].
53 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984 n.3 (May 29, 1992).
51

52

54 Id.at 22, 984-85.

55 Marden, supra note 40, at 749. For example, even components of foods, such as
phytosterols derived from vegetable oil, must be demonstrated by the manufacturer
to be GRAS in the level and form existing in the new product. Id.
56 1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,990.
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The FDA justified its policy on the grounds, articulated in the Final
Statement of Scope, that genetic modification through biotechnology
posed risks no different from genetic modification through traditional
methods, such as hybridization. Whatever its scientific merits, this Scope
principle provides support for regulating foods that have been altered,
whether through biotechnology or other methods, the same way. But by
treating biotech products more favorably than other types of new modified foods (for which the burden of proving they are GRAS remains on
the producer), the FDA's GRAS presumption for novel biotech products
actually does something different than the Scope principle suggests.
Instead of treating novel biotech products the same as novel foods modified by traditional methods, the FDA policy treats novel biotech products
the same as their unmodified counterparts. Only biotech products are
presumed, as a matter of policy, to be the same as their unmodified relatives. Rather than creating a level playing field for products altered
through biotechnology and products altered through traditional methods,
the FDA policy instead favors biotech products, treating them as fungible
with traditional (non-altered) varieties.
2.

Did Scientific Knowledge Require Treating New Biotech Foods
as GRAS?

The concept of "framing" arises from the notion that science cannot
provide purely objective answers on policy issues like food safety,
because the scope and methods of scientific inquiry are always informed
by value judgments. In the case of the 1992 FDA Policy, the presumption
of GRAS status for new foods modified through biotechnology was
presented by the FDA as a conclusion of scientific fact that biotech foods
do not pose new risks, at least where the new traits already exist in other
foods.57 Any value judgments made by the FDA in establishing this policy, or by the Administration committees that developed the Final Statement of Scope, are at best implicit.
But are the proponents of express articulation of framing overstating
the case? Can the 1992 FDA Policy be justified purely on the basis of
objective scientific principles, without reference to value judgments? Or
are the value judgments involved in the scientific inquiry so obvious that
they need not be stated, let alone debated? If it can be established as an
irrefutable scientific fact that foods modified through biotechnology are
identical to their non-modified counterparts, then the 1992 FDA Policy of
treating them the same for oversight purposes is sensible.
Unfortunately for the credibility of the FDA's policy, this line of reasoning runs into difficulty at both the factual and logical levels. First, at
the factual level, scientists within the FDA itself, in commenting on drafts
of the policy, disputed whether plants modified through biotechnology
57

Id.
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modification were identical to non-modified varieties for purposes of
food safety. For example, in an October 28, 1991, memorandum to the
Toxicology Section of the Biotechnology Working Group entitled "Analysis of Major Plant Toxicants," a scientist for the Department of Health
and Human Services wrote, "[a] genetically engineered plant may contain
an identical profile of expected plant toxicant levels . . . as is normally
found in a closely related, natural plant. However, genetically modified
plants could also contain unexpected[ly] high concentrations of plant toxicants."" s The memorandum describes two possible methods by which
existing levels of plant toxins might be enhanced as a result of biotech
modifications, or normally inactive toxicants might be expressed because
of the presence of the new traits.59 The report cautions that "the task of
analysis of all major toxins in genetically engineered plant food includes
the assessment of both expected toxicants and unexpected toxicants that
could occur in the modified plant food." 6 Another FDA scientist, commenting on the draft FDA policy, wrote:
The unintended effects [of biotech modification] cannot be written
off so easily by just implying that they too occur in traditional [plant]
breeding. There is a profound difference between the types of unexpected effects from traditional breeding and genetic engineering
which is just glanced over in this document. This is not to say that
they are more dangerous, just quite different, and this difference
should be and is not addressed. 6 '
In a memorandum commenting on the draft 1992 FDA Policy, the
director of the FDA Division of Toxicological Review and Evaluation
recommended that the draft be changed to indicate concerns within FDA
about the toxicity of plants modified through biotechnology.62 In his
summary of "recommended changes" to the policy, he wrote:
At this time it is unlikely that molecular and compositional analysis
can reasonably detect or predict all possible changes in toxicant
levels or the development of new toxic metabolites as a result of
genetic modifications introduced by the new methods of biotechnology. FDA believes that, until sufficient data and experience with the
new techniques of gene transfer have accumulated, the possibility of
unexpected, accidental changes in genetically engineered plants justi58 Memorandum from Edwin J. Matthews, Department of Health and Human

Services, to Toxicology Section of the Biotechnology Working Group (Oct. 28, 1991),
http://www.biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/02/02.pdf.
59 Id.
60

Id.

61

Memorandum from Dr. Louis J. Pribyl on Biotechnology Draft Document 1

(Mar. 6, 1992), http://www.biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/04/04.pdf [hereinafter Pribyl
Memorandum].
62 Memorandum from Samuel L. Shibko to James Maryanski (Jan. 31, 1992), http://
www.biointegrity.org/FDAdocs/03/03.pdf.
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fies a limited traditional toxicological study with the edible part of
the plant.63
The recommended change was not incorporated into the policy.
The fact that neither the 1992 FDA Policy, nor the Final Statement of
Scope or the background documents cited by the OSTP in support of the
Scope principles, attempt any detailed description of the scientific understanding of the safety effects of biotechnology, strongly suggests that
objective scientific principles do not strictly mandate the 1992 FDA Policy. Those documents state conclusions about the safety of biotechnology
without articulating the scientific methods, research, areas of debate or
uncertainty, or means of arriving at a consensus opinion that biotechnology poses no distinct risks from other methods of modification (or, going
further as the 1992 FDA Policy does, that plants altered through biotechnology pose no distinct risks from non-modified varieties).
Internal FDA documents take the draft policy to task for failure to
include any scientific background sufficient to justify the FDA's policy
decision to limit oversight of new biotech plants. One scientist wrote:
What has happened to the scientific elements of this document?...
The examples do not supply the scientific rational[e] that is
needed.... If the FDA wants to have a document based on scientific
principles these principles must be included, otherwise it will look
like and probably be just a political document.6 4
The Final Statement of Scope similarly articulates policy without a
detailed discussion of the state of scientific knowledge. The Final Statement of Scope quotes a report of the National Research Council

63

Id.

64 Pribyl Memorandum, supra note 61, at 1. These and other internal agency
documents were relied on in a challenge to the 1992 FDA Policy in Alliance for BioIntegrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (D.D.C. 2001). Among other claims, the
plaintiffs argued that the FDA's determination that GMOs are subject to GRAS
treatment was arbitrary and capricious under the FFDCA definition of "food
additive." The plaintiffs argued that, while nucleic acid proteins were generally
recognized as safe by themselves, scientists within the FDA itself were in
disagreement as to whether they were safe when used to alter other foods genetically.
The court held that "critical comments of lower-level FDA officials" on the 1992 FDA
Policy "do[ ] not invalidate the agency's subsequent application and interpretation of
its own regulation." Id. at 177-78 (internal citation omitted). While the court may
have felt constrained to defer to agency expertise, the internal disagreement among
the agency's own scientists, including the director of the Division of Toxicology
Review and Evaluation, however, seems to cast considerable doubt on the FDA's
determination that biotechnology is "generally recognized as safe." Other internal
FDA documents introduced by plaintiffs are available at http://www.biointegrity.org/
list.html.
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("NRC")6 5 for the five concepts underlying its policy conclusion that
"organisms that have been genetically modified are not per se of inherently greater risk than unmodified organisms."66 In its Preface, the NRC
report acknowledges that its goal was not "to write a primer on new technology, such as recombinant-DNA techniques, nor to provide a detailed
background on the biological information that has led to our present level
of knowledge., 67 Instead, the NRC was asked to consider the prospective regulatory environment for field testing of biotechnology, then in its
infancy, which posed obvious risks that previous laboratory testing had
not. 61 The NRC committees concluded that their "most important task
was to reach a consensus about the science surrounding the issues of environmental introductions."6 9 The resulting report offers recommendations
on risk assessment procedures with little discussion of the state of scientific knowledge, how its authors arrived at their "consensus," or what the
major areas of discussion or doubt might have been.
The NRC report cites a 1987 report of the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") 7' as the source of the "fundamental principle" that ultimately found its way into the Final Statement of Scope: "that safety
assessment of a recombinant DNA-modified organism 'should be based
on the nature of the organism and the environment into which it will be
introduced, not on the method by which it was modified.' ' , 71 The NAS
report offered even less scientific support for its conclusion that product,
not process, was material for oversight. The NAS's twenty-four-page
pamphlet has been described as "noteworthy for its brevity, simple language, and forthright conclusions about the scientific72 basis for releasing
genetically modified organisms in the environment.,
65 NATIONAL

ORGANISMS:

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

FIELD

TESTING

(National

GENETICALLY

1989)

70 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT

DNA-

FOR

DECISIONS

Academy

MODIFIED

Press

FRAMEWORK

[hereinafter NRC].
66 Final Statement of Scope, 57 Fed. Reg. 6755 (Feb. 27, 1992).
67 NRC, supra note 65, at viii.
68

Id. at vii-viii.

69

Id. at viii.

ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT: KEY ISSUES

(1987) [hereinafter

NAS].
71 NRC, supra note 65, at 2 (citing NAS, supra note 70).
72 KRIMSKY, supra note 39, at 141. For instance, the NAS pamphlet concludes,
"Adequate scientific knowledge exists to guide the safe and prudent use of R-DNAengineered organisms in the environment and to identify the most problematic

introductions." NAS, supra note 70, at 9. According to one observer of the
developing scientific and regulatory environment at the time, this conclusion "runs
counter to the belief of leading ecologists that predictive knowledge about safe
releases is still in its infancy and current methods of evaluating risks are unreliable."
KRIMSKY, supra note 39, at 141.
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In fact, the principles articulated in the NRC report, and adopted by
the Final Statement of Scope, are essentially inconsistent with the FDA's
creation of a blanket presumption of GRAS status for all new biotech
foods. According to one of those principles, "[i]nformation about the
process used to produce a [GM] organism is important in understanding
the characteristics of the product. However, the nature of the process is
not a useful criterion for determining whether the product requires less or
more oversight."7 3 The FDA (and indeed, the Final Statement of Scope)
focused on the second sentence of the principle, emphasizing that biotechnology would be treated as posing no new risks.7 4 While the Scope
principle creates a product-based rather than a process-based standard,
the first sentence of the principle makes clear that the proper level of
oversight cannot be determined without studying the product's characteristics - implicitly mandating a case-by-case evaluation of all new products, including those created using biotechnology. This case-by-case
evaluation of a new food product's final characteristics may be particularly important in the case of new foods created through biotechnology,
since the biotechnology's potential arises from the fact that it creates a
new product with distinct and often heralded characteristics not achievable through traditional breeding methods.75 The FDA's blanket presumption that all biotech products are GRAS flies in the face of the
73 Final Statement of Scope, 57 Fed. Reg. 6755 (Feb. 27, 1992).
71 The 1992 FDA Policy provides,
[t]he method by which food is produced or developed may in some cases help to
understand the safety or nutritional characteristics of the finished food.
However, the key factors in reviewing safety concerns should be the
characteristics of the food product, rather than the fact that the new methods are
used.
57 Fed. Reg. 22,984-85 (May 29, 1992).
75 In a 1984 report, the United States Office of Technology Assessment stated,
Biotechnology has the technical breadth and depth to change the industrial
community of the 21st century because of its potential to produce substantially
unlimited quantities of:
" products never before available,
" products that are currently in short supply,
* products that cost substantially less than products made by existing methods
of production,
" products that are safer than those that are now available, and
" products made with raw materials that may be more plentiful and less
expensive than those now used.
By virtue of its wide-reaching potential applications, biotechnology lies close to
the center of many of the world's major problems-malnutrition, disease, energy
availability and cost, and pollution.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, COMMERCIAL BIOTECHNOLOGY:
NATIONAL ANALYSIS

AN INTER-

65 (1984).

As Krimsky notes, one reason for the public anxiety concerning biotechnology is
because the technology has been trumpeted by science and industry as having transformative power, on par with synthetic organic chemistry and nuclear physics, both of
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NRC's recommendation that oversight be tailored to the characteristics
of the product.
3. Could More Conclusive Scientific Knowledge Provide an
Objective Basis for the GRAS Presumption?
The state of scientific knowledge as advised by the NRC and scientists
within the FDA, then, did not by itself mandate FDA's decision to not
require risk assessments for most new biotech food products. But was
that failure merely a matter of the novelty of biotech products at the time
the policy was established in 1992? Could more conclusive scientific
knowledge provide unequivocal proof of safety, obviating product-specific risk assessments for new biotech foods - and undercutting the notion
that culturally-contingent framing decisions shape scientific opinion
about risk?
The notion that objective scientific inquiry could provide the basis for
biotechnology policy and risk assessment standards runs into an obstacle
at the logical level as well as at the factual level. The Final Statement of
Scope turns on the notion that plants modified through biotechnology are
equivalent to plants modified through traditional breeding methods: they
are governed by "the same physical and biological laws";7 6 there is "no
conceptual distinction" between the new technology and traditional
breeding techniques;7 7 biotech plants "pose risks no different" than
plants modified by traditional methods;7 8 biotech methods "resemble the
classical methods" (and, if anything, are even more useful).79
Articulating this fundamental notion of equality between biotech and
traditional breeding methods and products, federal regulatory policy documents have cited the "substantial equivalence" doctrine developed by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
in 1992.80 That doctrine provides that if a biotech product is substantially
equivalent to a traditional food, then no further safety regulation is necessary."' "The concept of substantial equivalence embodies the idea that
which have proven to be potentially powerful forces for destruction as well as innovation. KRIMSKY, supra note 39, at 97. Krimsky notes further:
This is not simply another discovery in the slow, incremental growth of science.
This discovery has given birth to a new industrial process for radically reconfiguring biological matter.... The simultaneous pronouncements about power and
safety seem incongruous to a popular culture that has been sensitized to technological failure. Id.
76 Final Statement of Scope, 57 Fed. Reg. 6755.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79

Id.

80 See

ORGANIZATION

SAFETY EVALUATION

AND PRINCIPLES
81

Id. at 15.

FOR

ECONOMIC

COOPERATION

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

OF FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS

14 (1992).
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existing organisms used as food, or as a source of food, can be used as the
basis for comparison when assessing the safety of human consumption of
a food or food component that has been modified or is new." 82 The FDA
also cited the OECD substantial equivalence doctrine in establishing its
rules for review of biotech plants, including the GRAS presumption.8 3
The Final Statement of Scope purports to define plants modified by
biotechnology and plants modified by traditional breeding methods as
"likes." The 1992 FDA Policy, with its GRAS presumption for biotech
products, goes a step further, defining biotech plants and their unmodified relatives as "likes." The corollary to this definition of biotech and
non-biotech products as "likes," according to the equality principle, is
that they should be treated alike - and hence not subject to new or additional regulation or oversight.
The trouble with basing federal biotech regulatory policy on a general
presumption of substantial equivalence is that equality between two distinct objects cannot, by definition, be decided in the abstract. The principle that objects that are alike should have justice administered to them in
a like manner was elaborated by Aristotle 4 and remains an accepted
principle in philosophy." Scholars of both philosophy and law have
argued, however, that the enduring acceptance of the equality principle is
due to the fact that it expresses nothing but a tautology.86 "Objects that
are alike," for purposes of the equality principle, may mean one of three
things. First, it may mean objects that are alike in every respect. But this,
of course, is a null set. If this were its meaning, the equality principle
would have nothing whatsoever to say about how things should be
treated. Second, "objects that are alike" may mean objects that are alike
Id. at 14.
The 1992 FDA Policy states,
[t]he scientific concepts described in this guidance section are consistent with the
concepts of substantial equivalence of new foods discussed in a document under
development by the Group of National Experts on Safety in Biotechnology of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
1992 FDA Policy, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,992 (May 29, 1992).
84 See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131a-1131b (W.D. Ross trans.,
Oxford University Press 1925) ("The just, then, is a species of the proportionate
(proportion being not a property only of the kind of number which consists of
abstract units, but of number in general."); see also Metaphysica, in THE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE 1.5.1055b-1056b (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1928).
85 "To everyone the idea of justice inevitably suggests the notion of a certain
equality. From Plato and Aristotle, through St. Thomas Aquinas, down to the jurists,
moralists and philosophers of our own day runs a thread of universal agreement on
this point." CHAIM PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF
ARGUMENT 12 (John Petrie trans., Humanities Press 1963).
86 See, e.g., Bernard Williams, The Idea of Equality, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY 110, 111 (Peter Laslett & W. G. Runciman eds., 1962); Don Locke, The
Trivializability of Universalizability, 77 PHIL. REV. 25, (1968); Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547-48 (1982).
82
83
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in some respects. This definition, however, is as standardless as the first,
but for over-inclusiveness rather than under-inclusiveness. In other
words, no two things are alike in every respect, but all are alike in some
respect.8 7 Third, the equality principle may refer to objects that are alike
in some normatively relevant respect. Of course, "[normatively] alike
objects do not exist in nature; [normative] alikeness is established only
when people define categories."" To determine whether two objects
should be treated alike, one must refer to the norms underlying the treatment for which the objects are being compared. If both objects possess
the normatively relevant quality, then they are, of course, "alike" in that
respect. If one possesses the quality and the other does not, then they are
"unlike" - but only for purposes of the underlying norm and the quality
that justifies treatment according to that norm.
Biotech and non-biotech products - like any two separate objects - are
alike in some ways, and not alike in other ways. In order to define them
as "like" or "unlike" for purposes of determining how to regulate biotech
products, one must determine which of their features is normatively relevant for affording regulatory treatment. For instance, biotech alfalfa and
conventional alfalfa are alike in the sense that bees can pollinate both
crops. If this is the relevant characteristic for determining how we should
regulate biotech alfalfa, then we would call biotech and conventional
alfalfa "alike." But biotech (Roundup Ready) alfalfa and conventional
alfalfa are different in the sense that the first is tolerant to the herbicide
glyphosate, while the second is not. If this is the relevant characteristic
for determining how we should regulate biotech alfalfa, then we would
call the two "unlike."
Defining biotech products and their non-biotech counterparts as "like"
or "unlike," without more, is conclusory. The real work in deciding what
regulatory treatment to afford biotech alfalfa occurs at the prior stage deciding which characteristic of alfalfa is normatively relevant for affording regulatory controls. "Equivalence" is merely the tautology that follows once we have determined that the relevant characteristic is one that
both biotech and non-biotech alfalfa share.
Because the determination of "likeness" or "unlikeness" requires a reference - whether explicit or hidden - to the underlying norm triggering
regulation, the question of equivalence between two distinct objects cannot be decided in the abstract. It is meaningless to say two distinct products are "like" or "unlike" without knowing the normative purpose for
which they are being compared - Is the relative norm human mortality
risk? Human morbidity? Adult or child morbidity? Animal morbidity?
87

Westen, supra note 86, at 544.

88 Id. at 545. I use the word "normative" in place of Westen's "moral" to avoid

confusion. While any definition of the criteria of alikeness inherently involves
judgment, that judgment may derive just as easily from pragmatic as from
metaphysical principles.
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Biodiversity? But this is exactly what the Final Statement of Scope and
the 1992 FDA Policy purport to do - to define biotech products and nonbiotech products as "alike," absent any explicit reference to the underlying norms that might lead society to consider regulation.
The kinds of value judgments that underlie any application of the
''equality principle" (or "substantial equivalence") are precisely the kinds
of issues that scholars and international organizations have cited in
describing the "framing" of risk assessments. 89 International organizations like the FAO have challenged regulators to make those value judgments transparent and open to public debate in food safety risk
assessments. 90 As FDA Compliance Officer Linda Kahl commented in
reviewing the 1992 FDA Policy, the statement tries to "fit a square peg
into a round hole" by asking scientists, without specific data, to form
hypotheses on which to base a risk assessment. 91 Kahl continued:
It's no wonder there are so many different opinions - it is an exercise
in hypotheses forced on individuals whose jobs and training ordinarily deal with facts .... I wonder if part of the problems associated

with this approach - using scientific issues to set the stage for the
policy statement - are due to the fact that the scope of technical
experts assigned to the project did not include anyone whose usual
job is risk analysis. 92
The NRC Report on which the Final Statement of Scope is based
explicitly recognizes that biotech products are not "like" non-biotech
products in all respects. For example, the report discusses instances in
which introduction of a new, genetically-modified product into the wild
could pose environmental risks. In particular, in a chapter entitled
"Enhanced Weediness: A Major Environmental Issue," the report discusses two potential problems with new biotech products: first, that the
new strain may become dominant (weedy) in its environment, and second, that the biotech product may transfer its genetically-modified traits
to wild relatives in the environment, causing those wild plants to become
weedy.93 As the report explains, "weediness" may result when a plant
either escapes to a new environment that lacks ecological factors that
controlled the plant in its original habitat (such as a particular plant pest),
or when a plant in its original environment gains a trait that permits it to
overcome previous control factors. 94 "Any added trait that enhances performance (such as frost resistance or drought tolerance) would also be
89

See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.

90 See FAO, supra note 20, at vi, 3.
91 Memorandum from Linda Kahl, FDA Compliance Officer, to James Maryanski,

FDA Biotechnology Coordinator 1 (Jan. 8, 1992), http://tiny.cc/69cyq.
92 Id. at 2-3.
93 NRC, supra note 65, at 37-53.
94 Id. at 38.
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analogous to providing the plant with an advantage sometimes gained by
plants in a new environmental range."9 5
The report concludes that genetically-modified organisms are unlikely
to themselves revert to a wild or weedy state because highly domesticated
crops, such as most agricultural crops that are the subject of genetic modification, have lost their ability to compete effectively in the environment
with wild plants.96 The report does, however, acknowledge that plants
may acquire traits through genetic modification that may contribute to
weediness, and recommends field trials to identify such possibilities. 97
The report also notes that the likelihood of weediness is higher with some
forage crops 98 - such as the alfalfa at issue in Geertson, discussed below.
With regard to hybridization between biotech crops and their wild relatives, the report advises that precautions be taken where the genetically
modified strain has wild relatives in the environment. 99 The report notes
that this concern is less pronounced in North America because "[t]he
paucity of crops derived from North American sources means there will
be relatively few opportunities for hybridization between crops and wild
relatives in the United States."' 0 0 The report notes, however, that
"greater care may be needed" in the introduction of genetically modified
crops in other areas, such as Asia Minor, southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and South America, which are the source of many cultivated
food crops. 1'
IV.

CASTING LIGHT ON FIRST-ORDER FRAMING: COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS AND BIOTECH RISK ASSESSMENT POLICY
IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE

The Final Statement of Scope implicitly recognizes that the proper
scope of oversight will vary depending upon circumstances and attendant
risks. The Final Statement of Scope states the principle that "oversight
will be exercised only where the risk posed by the introduction is unreasonable, that is, when the value of the reduction in risk obtained by additional oversight is greater than the cost thereby imposed."'0 2 After

articulating the scope principles focusing on product rather than process,
the Final Statement of Scope returns to this point to justify its approach:
95 Id.
96 Id. at 42. "Domesticity arises because many characteristics that would enhance
weediness (seed shattering, thorns, seed dormancy, and bitterness) have been
deliberately eliminated from the crop plant through intensive breeding efforts." Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 52.
99 Id. at 43.

100 Id.

101 Id. at 47.
102 Final Statement of Scope, supra note 42, at 6753.
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[A]gency resources are scarce, and cannot be applied to every possible problem; responsible officials must choose carefully the risks of
highest concern and find the best way to combat them. In order to
protect the public and the environment, the scope of oversight
should help focus agency efforts at reduction of the most important
risks (and at least cost, so that society's resources are kept available
to combat the next highest risks).1 °3
But the relative costs of risk and oversight necessarily depend upon circumstances, which vary from country to country. In countries where the
occurrence of a particular risk would be catastrophic for human health
and welfare, the cost of the risk outweighs the cost of regulation. In
countries where the occurrence of the risk would have less extreme consequences, the cost of regulation may be higher than the cost of the risk.
Incorporating an abstract presumption of equivalence into particular
policy contexts, involving particular products in particular circumstances,
prevents the legal system and the polity from engaging in an open and
informed discussion of the underlying circumstances, attendant risks, and
value judgments that prompted the polity to consider regulation, and the
costs and benefits of biotechnology in that particular instance. Instead,
the public is largely excluded from the conversation, and equivalence is
presumed and applied in very different contexts. At the domestic level,
failure to acknowledge the framing of risk assessment decisions is an
infringement of the democratic process.
Obscuring the underlying issues in biotech regulation becomes even
more troubling when products authorized by one country's framing of the
risk assessment (or lack thereof) become introduced into international
trade. The producing/exporting country's value judgments carry a presumption of validity by virtue of the fact that they lead to the production
and export of biotech products, which other countries must now contend
with through regulation, sometimes in the face of WTO challenges (and
costs). As the FAO has pointed out, a technology's risks and benefits
may vary considerably depending on a country's cultural, political, economic, and environmental context. 10 4 The "weediness" example cited by
the NRC Report is a case in point: while hybridization between biotech
plants and wild relatives is of relatively low concern in North America
(and thus may not outweigh the costs of regulation), it is of considerably
higher concern in areas such as Asia Minor, whose ecosystems include
more wild relatives of cultivated crops. Assumption of a value judgment
that framed a risk assessment by a sovereign in North America by exporting biotech products to Asia Minor, without making that framing decision
explicit and subject to inquiry and challenge in the new circumstances,
103
104

Id. at 6756 (emphases added).
FAO, supra note 20, at vi.
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invokes a question of infringement of the sovereignty of the importing
country.
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Biotechnology Regulation in the U.S.
The United States is in a unique position globally with regard to biotechnology, and its value judgments and framing decisions might reasonably be expected to reflect its unique circumstances. At the inception of
the development of biotechnology, the United States led the world in
commercial development of biotechnology, primarily because of the combination of a strong research base in biomedical sciences, federal government support, and existence of venture capital to fund ideas.1 °5 Its
government and government-supported university laboratories were the
birthplace of many of the scientific advances in biotechnology. 10 6 In
addition to the federal and state governments, U.S. industry provided
early capital and promotion of new biotechnology products. °7 In 1991,
half of new biotechnology companies were located in five states (California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland), in proximity
to major bioscience research universities. 10 8 In 1991, the U.S. Office of
Technology Assessment reported that "[d]edicated biotechnology companies are almost exclusively a U.S. phenomenon."' 0'9 As of 1992, the biotechnology industry in the United States included 400 start-up firms, 200
established firms that had diversified into biotechnology, and more than
200 supply firms," 0 and produced $2 billion worth of pharmaceuticals,
diagnostic tests, and agricultural products."'
Currently, farmers in the United States grow approximately half of all
planted acreage of biotech crops. In 2008, the United States had 62.5
million acres planted to biotech crops; Argentina, the second-largest
biotech crop producer, planted twenty-one million. 1 2 As of 2000, United
States firms, nonprofits, universities, and the federal government owned
sixty-two percent
of all United States patents on agricultural biotechnol13
ogy products.
105

See

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

A GLOBAL ECONOMY
106

See

PRESIDENT'S

ACHIEVING

THE

COUNCIL OF

PROMISE OF THE

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT I

See

108

Id. at 35-36.

109

ADVISORS

BIOSCIENCE

ON

OTA, supra note 105, at 3.

112 CLIVE JAMES,

SCIENCE

AND

TECHNOLOGY,

REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF THE

supra note 39, at 25-42.

110 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,

I" Id. at 4-5.

BIOTECHNOLOGY IN

(Dec. 1992).

107

KRIMSKY,

OTA-BA-494,

3 (Oct. 1991) [hereinafter OTA].

ISAAA,

supra note 44, at 4.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: BRIEF

39

GLOBAL STATUS OF

BIOTECH/GM CROPS: 2008 4, 6 (2008), http://tiny.cc/t8cxo
[hereinafter ISAAA, Commercialized Biotech Crops 2008].
113 See United States Dept. of Agriculture Economic Research Service,
Agricultural Biotechnology Intellectual Property: Overview Chart 3 (Aug. 26, 2004),
COMMERCIALIZED
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Not surprisingly, with this substantial nascent industry for developing
and promoting biotechnology products, the United States government
showed a strong interest in fostering the biotechnology industry in its
oversight and funding policies. The President's Council on Competitiveness described the "proper role for the U.S. government" as "(1)
provid[ing] needed support to activities that are undersupported by the
market[; and] (2) reduc[ing] artificial barriers to proper market functioning.""' 4 The President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology
in 1992 recommended that the federal government's biotechnology policy
work toward two goals: "[p]romoting the health of the American people
and all mankind through research in the biosciences; and [flostering a
vigorous American biotechnology industry.""' 5 In a memorandum commenting on the 1992 FDA Policy, FDA Commissioner David Kessler
cited the United States' unique economic context as a factor motivating
the policy on biotech oversight: "The approach and provisions of [the
1992 FDA Policy] are consistent with the general biotechnology policy
established by the Office of the President in the recently published
'scope' document. It also responds to White House interest in ensuring
the safe, speedy development of the U.S. biotechnology industry.""' 6
The Kessler Memorandum suggests another unique nation-specific situation - the political culture of the 1980s and 1990s - that framed the
Administration and FDA's values and decisions to not conduct pre-market risk assessments of new biotech products. When the Office of Science
and Technology Policy and the FDA were considering regulation of new
biotech products, the U.S. political pendulum had swung in favor of less
government regulation and greater support for free markets and business.
In this political context, regulators and risk assessors would likely be
guided by the values of promoting the biotech industry's growth and limiting regulation. These values logically led to decisions to regulate
biotech products under existing laws and regulations enacted before
biotech products were contemplated, and to make detailed risk assessments presumptively unnecessary for most new biotech products.
In comparison with this strong incentive to support the burgeoning
U.S. biotech industry, other risks for the U.S., might reasonably be
viewed as relatively minor. With regard to risks to the environment, the
NRC study pointed out that a "major environmental issue" was the
potential for enhanced weediness, particularly the potential of biotech
plants to pass the new traits to wild relatives, which then gain a competihttp://www.ers.usda.gov/data/AgBiotechIP/Gallery/Graphic3.htm
(backup
provided in Excel format linked to web address).
11 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 44, at 5.

data

115 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra

note 106, at 1.
116 Kessler Memorandum, supra note 52, at 2.

GMO RISK ASSESSMENT

2010]

tive advantage in natural ecosystems and harm biodiversity." 7 The NRC
report pointed out that "[t]emperate North America, especially the
United States, includes the home ranges for very few crops, as U.S. agriculture is based largely on crops of foreign origin,"" 8 resulting in relatively few opportunities for hybridization between genetically engineered
crops and wild relatives in the U.S." 9
Other potential risks of biotechnology also have relatively low associated costs in the U.S., at least when all benefits are considered. U.S.
farmers may face substantial disadvantage under contracts to plant
biotech seed, such as the prohibition against saving seed for next year's
planting.120 But even U.S. farmers who may face substantial economic
losses due to negligent seed saving or inadvertent contamination of
neighboring fields will not ordinarily face starvation as a result, as may be
the case for subsistence farmers in developing countries who lack
resources other than the saved seed. As a matter of federal policy, these
costs to U.S. farmers may be offset by the benefits that flow to agricultural biotechnology patent holders who can protect their intellectual
property rights, receiving remuneration for violations of those rights by
seed-saving farmers, and to farmers themselves who may be able to produce higher yields using fewer chemical inputs. Moreover, the legal protection of intellectual property rights provides incentives for
biotechnology companies to invest substantial capital in research and
development of new biotech products that may substantially benefit society. Finally, while human health risks such as allergenicity, toxicity,
antibiotic resistance, and unforeseeable health effects cannot be disproven at this stage in the development and use of biotech foods, no such
effects have so far been documented for biotechnology products generally.' 2 ' While there is some concern among scientists that particular

117 NRC, supra note 65, at 37-53.
118

Id. at 43.

119

Id.

120

See FARMERS' LEGAL ACTION GROUP,

FARMERS' GUIDE TO

GMOs 27 (2d ed.

Feb. 2009), available at http://www.flaginc.org/topics/pubs/arts/FGtoGMOs2009.pdf.
The FLAG study reports that Monsanto alone investigates approximately 500 farmers
per year for seed saving and has collected $21,500,000 in court judgments and $85
million annually in out-of-court settlements with farmers, many but not all of which
involve seed saving. Id. at 29. Farmers may face other disadvantages resulting from
their inferior bargaining power with biotech companies, such as lack of opportunity to
negotiate contract terms; remedies for damages limited to replacement of seed or
reimbursement of the price of the seed; legal obligations to conduct certain farming
practices and to keep GMO products out of unauthorized marketing channels; and
potential liability for contamination of neighboring farms. Id. at 8-42.
121 Union of Concerned Scientists, Risks of Genetic Engineering, http://tiny.cc/
ucsusa (last revised Oct. 30, 2002).
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products might pose health risks,' 22 the United States may feel that those
risks are sufficiently addressed by its risk assessment policy.
B.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of Biotechnology Regulation Outside the U.S.

For other countries, the calculation of benefits and risks of biotechnology adoption - and hence the value judgments that frame risk assessments - may come out considerable differently than in the U.S. To begin
with, few countries have a biotechnology industry as robust as that of the
U.S.,' 23 and thus do not have the potential benefits of industry growth to
offset any environmental, sociological, or health costs. Second, those
costs may be considerably higher for other countries than for the U.S.,
depending on that country's circumstances.
In developing countries, for example, the benefits of biotechnology are
sometimes viewed with skepticism for a number of reasons. First,
because biotechnology research and development has primarily been
conducted by entities in temperate regions, most research has been
devoted to making incremental improvements (generally herbicide and
pesticide resistance) to major temperate agricultural crops.' 2 4 For tropical regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, these advances offer little benefit. ' 5 If more biotechnological improvements were made to increase the
shelf life or disease resistance of tropical food crops such as cassava,
yams, millet and sorghum, developing countries in tropical regions would
benefit significantly more from their adoption.'2 6 Biotechnological development of these crops has been slow, however, because biotechnology
research has been largely funded by the private sector, which has little
incentive to develop products for poor regions and farmers.' 27 2 Developing country participation in biotechnology research is limited.' 1
122 See id.; see also supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
123

Japan has made biotechnology development a national priority. See OTA,

supra note 105, at 19-21.
124 See Review of Artificial Barriers to U.S. Agricultural Trade and Foreign Food
Assistance: Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 108th Cong. 80-82 (2003) (testimony
of Calestous Juma, Director, Program for Science Technology and Innovation, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) [hereinafter Juma], available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/hearings/108/1081.pdf.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 82.
127 Id.; see also Zarrilli, supra note 10, at 4-5.
128 See Prabhu Pingali & Terry Raney, From Green Revolution to Gene Revolution:
How Will the Poor Fare? (U.N. Food & Agric. Org., ESA Working Paper No. 05-09,
2005), available at http://tiny.cc/19rf2. Pingali & Raney estimated that the private
sector in developing countries invested, at best, only one-third the amount invested by
the private sector in developed countries. Id. at 5-6. As of 2005, only three
developing countries - China, India, and Brazil - had extensive research programs in
all areas of biotechnology. Id. at 6.

2010]

GMO RISK ASSESSMENT

Developing countries also face high socio-economic risks associated
with dependence upon foreign intellectual property holders. Because
technology agreements between biotech patent holders and farmers usually prohibit farmers from saving seed for replanting the following year,
farmers in developing countries who begin to grow biotech crops may
face the new expense each year of paying for seed. For small and subsistence farmers operating on very tight margins, this input cost may
become prohibitive. Poor farmers may invest in converting their operations for growing biotech crops and then, in lean years, find themselves
unable to afford the seed. 2 9
Moreover, subsistence farming may be less suited to biotechnology
than large monocrop farms. One of the recognized risks of biotech plants
is the potential for hybridization with wild relatives, creating a weedy
strain that outcompetes other plants and threatens biodiversity.13 ° The
potential for biodiversity loss, while significant for all agricultural ecosystems, may be devastating for subsistence farmers. Subsistence farming
depends on a diversity of crops - if one or more crops fails during a season, the household may be able to subsist on other crops or wild plants
that fared better. If biodiversity is lost due to biotech plants in an ecosystem, subsistence farmers risk losing food security alternatives - and falling into increased dependency on patented foreign technology. Finally,
reluctance to adopt biotechnology subject to foreign patents may be exacerbated where the source material for the invention was taken from
developing countries themselves with little or no compensation, and the
131
subsequent patented products sold to those countries at high prices.
In developed countries outside the United States, the cost-benefit analysis may be rather simple, and may militate against widespread acceptance of GMOs. Developed countries are generally not concerned with
food security; agricultural policy in Europe tends to be preoccupied with
overproduction, rather than the underproduction issues that might be
remedied by biotechnology products. 31 With a smaller and more fragIn an attempt to mitigate this risk, biotechnology companies have, in some
cases, entered into agreements with developing country governments to share
agricultural biotechnology on a preferential basis, such as by offering royalty-free
licenses for production by low-income farmers for local consumption. See Juma,
supra note 124, at 8.
130 NRC, supra note 65, at 43-53.
131 See Zarrilli, supra note 10, at 5. Although the Convention on Biological
Diversity does require "benefit sharing" with countries providing source material for
plant-based inventions, the United States is not a party to the CBD, and the WTO
and the TRIPS agreement do not address these situations. See id. at 5.
132 Juma, supra note 124, at 5. While some biotechnology advancements have
been devoted to improved taste, texture or nutritional value that might appeal to
consumers in affluent countries, most biotechnology advantages derive from
increased yields, decreased pesticide use, and better weed control (potentially
129
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mented industry1 33 and no society-wide advantage to be gained by
increasing yields, these countries may reasonably see few benefits to outweigh the costs of the known environmental risks and unforeseeable
health risks associated with biotechnology.
V.

GEERTSON SEED FARMS V. JOHANNS: THE CONTEXTUAL
PARTICULARITY OF RISK ASSESSMENT

Countries that assess risk of biotech products differently from the U.S.
find themselves behind the eight-ball in international trade proceedings:
While their risk assessments must stand up to inquiry into their methodology and scientific objectivity, the first-order risk assessments (or lack
thereof) by the U.S. (or other biotech producing countries) are not similarly scrutinized. Those first-order risk assessments, no less than the risk
assessments conducted by importing countries, are framed by value judgments and assumptions that are specific to that nation's economic, legal,
cultural, social and environmental values.'
If the framing decisions of
the producing/exporting country are not made explicit in international
trade disputes, those decisions will carry a tacit presumption of legitimacy, by virtue of the fact that they put biotech products on the international market. In WTO challenges, the distinct - but appropriate framing decisions of importing countries must then somehow disprove or
negate the risk assessment arising from the producing/exporting country's
value judgments, without the opportunity to show that the first-order risk
assessment was contingent upon value judgments and framing decisions
that do not, and should not, apply to the importing country.
Is it too late? With U.S. biotech policy now being guided for nearly
two decades by the presumption of substantial equivalence in the Final
Statement of Scope, and by federal regulations and guidance implementing that policy and its presumption, can the framing decisions of the U.S.
and other exporting countries be meaningfully incorporated into the
international trade dialogue? Can the unique value judgments and
resulting risk assessments of importing countries be placed on an equal
footing with the value judgments made by producing/exporting countries? Or will the reality of biotech products in international trade effectively undermine any attempt at a more explicit understanding of the role
of framing in all risk assessments?
There are signs that the U.S. government is beginning to recognize, as a
matter of federal regulatory policy, the logical problems and undesired
consequences of failing to make framing decisions transparent, and the
problem with defining "substantial equivalence" in the abstract. In two
accompanied by higher used of herbicides), rather than discernible taste or nutritional
advantages. See Zarrilli, supra note 10, at 3.
133 See OTA, supra note 105, at 19.
134

FAO, supra note 20, at vi.
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recent federal court cases, Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns'3 5 and Center
for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 36 non-biotech farmers and consumer groups

challenged USDA's decision to end all regulatory oversight of glyphosate-tolerant ("Roundup Ready") alfalfa and sugar beets, respectively.
USDA had made the decision without preparing an Environmental
Impact Statement ("EIS"), i.e., without a complete risk assessment. The
courts in both cases held that USDA violated the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") 3 7 by failing to conduct an EIS - a requirement
for all "major Federal13 8actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.'

The Plaintiffs in Geertson were alfalfa growers, the Sierra Club, and
other farmer and consumer associations. 39 The parties' cross-motions
for summary judgment raised
a close question of first impression: whether the introduction of a
genetically engineered crop that might significantly decrease the
availability or even eliminate all non-genetically engineered varieties
is a 'significant environmental impact' requiring the preparation of
an environmental impact statement, at least where it involves the
fourth largest crop in the United States. 4 °
Because the biotech product in Geertson, Roundup Ready alfalfa, was
engineered to resist an herbicide (glyphosate, used in the Monsanto herbicide Roundup), it was initially subject to regulation under the Plant
Protection Act ("PPA").' 4 1 The PPA gives USDA's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service ("APHIS") jurisdiction over "organisms and
products altered or produced through genetic engineering that are plant
pests or believed to be plant pests."' 4 2 Monsanto, the manufacturer of
Roundup (the herbicide that the biotech alfalfa was modified to tolerate),
submitted a petition seeking a determination that the Roundup Ready
143
alfalfa was not a plant pest risk and therefore should not be regulated.
APHIS granted the petition,
withdrawing all oversight of the genetically
44
engineered alfalfa strain.'
135 Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D.
Calif. Feb. 13, 2007).
136

Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227 (N.

D. Calif. Sep. 21, 2009).
137 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70a (2006).
138 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); see Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *9.
139 Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *1.
140 Id.
141 7 U.S.C. § 7711(a) (2006).
142 7 C.F.R. § 340.0(a)(2) n. 1 (2009).
14 Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *1; see 7 C.F.R. § 340.6 (2009) (outlining process
for submitting petitions for deregulated status).
144 Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *1.
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Before granting the petition, APHIS conducted an Environmental
Assessment ("EA") pursuant to NEPA.'4 5 Of the 663 comments APHIS
46
received in response to the EA, 520 opposed complete deregulation.
On June 14, 2005, APHIS issued a Finding of No Significant Impact
47
("FONSI") and granted the petition for deregulation in its entirety.
Based on its finding that the deregulation of Roundup Ready alfalfa did
not have a significant impact on the environment, APHIS did not prepare
an EIS.
Plaintiffs argued that alfalfa was different from other deregulated
biotech products because bees could pollinate alfalfa over long distances,
making it extremely difficult for farmers to isolate biotech and nonbiotech alfalfa to prevent contamination in the field.' 4 ' The court noted
APHIS's own finding of fact in the14EA
that insects pollinate alfalfa up to
9
two miles from the pollen source.
APHIS, much like the FDA, defended its decision on the basis of the
equivalence between biotech alfalfa and its non-modified counterpart.
APHIS argued that its action was justified even if contamination was
inevitable, because it had found that the glyphosate-resistant gene was
not toxic or pathogenic to humans and livestock - that the geneticallyengineered enzyme for glyphosate resistance was "equivalent in all biological respects" to natural enzymes found in nature. 50 The EA states
that the protein used in Roundup Ready alfalfa has been encoded in
145 An EA is "a concise public document that briefly provide[s] sufficient evidence
and analysis for determining whether to prepare an EIS or a finding of no significant
impact." Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th
Cir. 1998).
146 Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *2.
14 Id. at *2; see Availability Determination of Nonregulated Status for Alfalfa
Genetically Engineered for Tolerance to the Herbicide Glyphosate, 70 Fed. Reg.
36,917 (Jun. 27, 2005). The original EA and FONSI are available at http://tiny.cc/
3o2lr [hereinafter Alfalfa FONSI/EA].
148 Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *4-5.
149 Id. at *2, *5.
150 Id. at *8. APHIS also advanced several other arguments in support of its
decision to deregulate glyphosate-tolerant alfalfa. First, APHIS concluded, based on

the "buffer zones" required by the National Organic Program, that it was the
responsibility of organic farmers, not the growers of biotech varieties, to protect their
crops and seed supplies from contamination - in effect, that organic and conventional
farmers had a duty to "fence out" contamination. Id. at *5-6; see Thomas P. Redick &
A. Bryan Endres, Litigating the Economic Impacts of Biotech Crops,

NAT.

& ENV'T 24, 27 (2008) (discussing potential development of "fence in/
fence out" rule, borrowed from livestock context, to apply to biotech contamination).
APHIS also argued that the National Organic Program did not "necessarily" prohibit
the unintentional presence of biotech traits. Geertson, 2007 WL 518624, at *5.
Second, APHIS argued that NEPA only requires consideration of physical
environmental impacts, not the "economic impacts" alleged by the plaintiffs. Id. at
RESOURCES
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other plants without indication of toxicity.' 51 The EA also emphasized
that the protein is taken from a naturally occurring organism, a soilinhabiting bacterial plant pathogen, and is similar to naturally occurring
152
alfalfa genes.
In its brief opposing the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment,
APHIS dismissed the argument that loss of non-biotech alfalfa might be a
significant environmental effect under NEPA, arguing:
[A]ny reproduction [of biotech genes in non-biotech alfalfa] would
lack "biological significance" because the gene for the challenged
alfalfa's engineered enzyme is (1) "similar to the gene that is normally present in alfalfa and is not known to have any toxic property"
and (2) also equivalent to a natural enzyme present in both green
plants and microorganisms inhabiting "common soil."' 53
At the hearing, the court pressed counsel on the argument:
THE COURT: . . .[I]t's your view that even if it eliminates all
organic alfalfa, no - a FONSI would be appropriate, even if it wipes
it out?
MR. PAGE: Yes, Your Honor. The view is, is that unless wiping it
out would precipitate a significant environmental effect on water, air,
soils or species, it's not cognizable under NEPABecause, quite frankly, APHIS's scientific knowledge . . . and the
analysis underlying its conclusion and determination that the gene
that has been engineered here is identical in all relevant biological
respects to a gene that has been common in nature since time
[im]memorial, deserves to THE COURT: ...Okay. So they are positing a case in which they
believe that the introduction of the ... genetically-engineered alfalfa
11 See, e.g., APHIS, USDA,

RETURN TO

REGULATED

STATUS

OF

ALFALFA

GENETICALLY ENGINEERED FOR TOLERANCE TO THE HERBICIDE GLYPHOSPHATE 1

(2005), available at http://tiny.cc/ilwlO; Alfalfa FONSI/EA, supra note 147, at 9 ("It
does not cause disease and has a history of safe use in a number of deregulated
genetically engineered plants (e.g., corn, cotton and soybean varieties)."); Id. at 10

("Expression of [the gene]in [alfalfa] is not expected to cause plant disease or
influence susceptibility of [the encoded alfalfa] or their progeny to diseases or other
pests."; "No qualitative or quantitative observations indicated any biologically
meaningful differences from control populations or differences outside the range of
conventional alfalfa norms.").
152 Id. at 12 ("The gene that codes for the enzyme EPSPS that confers glyphosate
tolerance is from the bacterium Agrobacterium sp. strain CP4. This gene is similar to
the gene that is normally present in alfalfa and is not known to have any toxic
property.").
153 Federal Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
atl, Geertsen Seed Farms Inc. v. Johanns, 439 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D. Calif. Nov. 17,
2006) (No. C-06-1075 CRB).
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will actually eliminate organic alfalfa. And you're coming back and
saying ... if it did happen, that would not qualify. So what....
Because that still doesn't result in ... a significant environmental

impact, the elimination of all organic alfalfa.
MR. PAGE: Yes, Your Honor."'
When further pressed by the court, counsel for the government
asserted that, by making alfalfa resistant to glyphosate, the geneticallyengineered strain merely restored a natural ecosystem balance before the
widespread use of herbicides and pesticides, when alfalfa was not
threatened by chemical inputs:
THE COURT: Let's say it disappears. Say it disappears.
MR. PAGE: Under the theory that it would have disappeared,
what would have disappeared, Your Honor? ...
What has been lost is the resist-the vulnerability of this crop to a
manmade [herbicide]....
THE COURT: So it's sort of like a super race of alfalfa. You're
saying we got rid of all those weaklings out there, and now we have
got a super race, sort of a wunderkind of produce, of grasses....
But are you really saying - I hear when you are saying that we
have developed a better product.... And they come in and say, well,
that's your view that it's a better product. We think, actually, it's not;
and we'd sure like you to study it, because you are getting rid of the,
quote, inferior product....

You're saying you wouldn't even support that?
MR. PAGE: Well, Your Honor, no, because what we would have
to assume, to assume that the hypothetical you described is true, is
that the vulnerability and susceptibility of alfalfa domestically grown
to a manmade pesticide is part of the balance of nature. Because by
taking the enzyme that's located elsewhere in the natural environment and designing it to also be present in alfalfa, what's undisputed
is you simply brought back a natural metabolic155process that used to
exist before all of these herbicides were used.
As applied by the government in Geertson, the Final Statement of
Scope principles result in several extraordinary positions: (1) alfalfa that
is altered by biotechnology to resist an herbicide is entirely fungible, both
environmentally and commercially, with non-biotech alfalfa; (2) inserting
into alfalfa a gene from bacteria that occurs in nature - but never in
alfalfa - does not create a distinct product; and (3) genetically-engineered
154 Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, at 51-53, Geertsen Seed Farms Inc. v.
Johanns, 439 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D. Calif. Nov. 17, 2006) (No. C-06-1075 CRB) (on
file with author).
155 Id. at 57-59.
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alfalfa is more "natural" than conventional alfalfa because the genetically-engineered variety is resistant to new, man-made chemical inputs.
After expressing deep skepticism about the government's treatment of
GMO alfalfa and conventional alfalfa as interchangeable, the district
court held that the potential elimination of conventional alfalfa was a
"significant environmental impact" under NEPA and required preparation of an EIS.' 5 6 The court rejected the government's assertion that
GMO and conventional alfalfa were interchangeable:
For those farmers who choose to grow non-genetically-engineered
alfalfa, the possibility that their crops will be infected with the engineered gene is tantamount to the elimination of all alfalfa; they cannot grow their chosen crop. The government's apparent belief that
the farmers' and consumers' choice is irrational because the engineered gene is similar in all biological respects to a gene found in
nature (although never in alfalfa) is beside the point. An action
which potentially eliminates or at least greatly reduces the availability of a particular plan - here, non-engineered
alfalfa - has a signifi1 57
cant effect on the human environment.
In rejecting the government's argument, the court in Geertson alluded
to the flaw in the substantial equivalence doctrine - that substantial
equivalence tends to obscure the normative choice among policy options
that must occur to decide if two distinct objects are "alike" and "should
be treated alike" for purposes of regulation. The government in Geertson
contented that it was not required to prepare an EIS because it found
that genetically-engineered alfalfa does not have harmful health effects
on humans or livestock - a determination of "likeness" with regard to
human and animal mortality and morbidity.' 58 While accepting this finding as a matter of deference to agency expertise, the court noted that
"[p]ublic health and safety... is only one of [the] factors that an agency
should consider when determining whether a major federal action may
have a significant environmental impact."' 5 9 While APHIS may have
determined that engineered and non-engineered alfalfa are "alike" for
purposes of health risks to humans and livestock, Congress in NEPA
made the normative choice to require preparation of an EIS in circumstances that go beyond health risks: "One of Congress's express goals in
adopting NEPA was to 'attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the
environment without degradation, risk to health and safety, or other
undesirableand unintended consequences."" 6 With regard to the potential to impact biodiversity by eliminating non-engineered alfalfa, the
Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *8-9
(N.D. Calif. Feb. 13, 2007).
157 Id. at *9 (emphasis added).
158 Id. at *8.
156

159 Id.
160

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added by court)).
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court held that engineered and non-engineered alfalfa were "unlike" and
should be so treated. In both the government's and the court's analysis,
the determining factor is the choice of the relevant underlying norm, not
the tautological conclusion
that two products should be treated alike
161
alike.
are
they
when
While the scope of Geertson's impact on federal policy remains to be
seen, another judge on the same court has already followed Geertson's
reasoning. In Centerfor Food Safety, plaintiffs challenged APHIS's decision to deregulate Roundup Ready sugar beets without conducting an
EIS. The court noted APHIS's own findings that sugar beet pollen can
frequently disperse up to 800 meters, 62 and that gene transfer from
genetically modified sugar beets to non-modified sugar beets, 163and to
related species of red table beets and Swiss chard, was possible.
APHIS declined to consider the effect of gene transmission to other
plants on the grounds that any loss of non-genetically-modified sugar
64
beet markets was a socio-economic effect that NEPA did not reach.1
As in the alfalfa case, APHIS's view that the effects of biotech gene
transmission are purely socio-economic, not physical or biological, is possible only if the two crops are considered fungible. The court, following
Geertson, rejected APHIS's argument that biotech gene transmission was
not a "significant environmental effect" under NEPA. "As the court concluded in Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, this Court finds that the potential elimination of farmer's choice to grow non-genetically engineered
crops, or a consumer's choice to eat non-genetically engineered food, and
an action that potentially eliminates or reduces the availability of1 65a particular plant has a significant effect on the human environment.'
VI.

NAMING THE FRAMING: PRESERVING SOVEREIGNTY
AND LEGITIMACY IN THE

WTO

Science informed by value judgments and assumptions is an indispensable part of any risk assessment. And assessment of risks is an indispensable part of any determination of how to expend limited government
161

On March 12, 2007, the district court enjoined further sale and planting of

Roundup Ready alfalfa. Geertson, 2007 WL 776146, at *2 (granting preliminary
injunction); id. at *9 (N.D.Cal. May 3, 2007) (entering permanent injunction); id. at *4

(granting motion to correct or amend judgment). The Ninth Circuit upheld the
injunction on appeal, and on June 24, 2009, denied a petition for rehearing. Geertson
Seed Farms v. Johanns, 570 F.3d 1130, 1141 (9th Cir. 2009).
162 Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack, No. C 08-00484 JSW, 2009 WL 3047227, at
*7 (N. D. Calif. Sep. 21, 2009).
163 Id. ("Even APHIS acknowledged that '[g]ene introgression from [event H7-1]
into wild or cultivated sexually compatible plants is possible.'").
164 Id. at *8. APHIS also concluded, puzzlingly, that it need not consider gene

transmission because there was no evidence of an organic sugar beet market. Id.
165 Id. at *9.
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resources. That process is as indispensable for nations with industries
proposing to develop and market new technologies as it is for countries
considering whether or how to regulate the import of those technologies.
This reality need not be fatal to the legitimacy of international technology trade. It also need not give way to wholly subjective health and
safety standards unsupported by science, or mere pretexts for protection
of domestic industry. Making the framing decisions underlying a risk
assessment transparent can aid the democratic legitimacy of any domestic
risk assessment by giving the public a voice in those value judgments and
assumptions. Transparency can also aid the legitimacy of the international trade regime and the WTO by providing an opportunity for an
importing country to openly compare its own framing decisions with
those of the producing/exporting nation. With both nations' context-specific value judgments brought into the WTO debate, the importing (and
trade restricting) nation may more easily make the argument that affording respect its value judgments is more appropriate than importing the
producing/exporting nation's value judgments, which assessed the risks in
very different circumstances.
Moreover, sound science can and should still function to place boundaries on the use of SPS measures to limit imports, either out of irrational
fear or as a pretext for protection of domestic industry. A recent decision
of the WTO Appellate Body outside the biotech context offers a model
of this type of protection of nation-specific risk assessment (and thus sovereignty) while still requiring that decisions taken be consistent with
sound science. In United States-Continued Suspension of Obligationsin
the EC-Hormones Dispute ("US-Continued Suspension").6 6 the Appellate Body considered an attempt by the EC to implement and support an
SPS measure. The EC appealed a decision of the Panel that favored a
strict approach to scientific evidence and risk assessment. The Panel had
relied heavily on standards set in risk assessments by international bodies,
which would likely result in greater uniformity of SPS measures among
WTO member states. The Appellate Body rejected this approach as too
rigid, announcing instead a standard that permits greater individuality of
SPS measures among WTO members, while balancing that freedom with
standards that seek to ensure rigorous scientific review of even the most
nation-specific solutions.
In reviewing the EC's risk assessment, the Panel had conducted its own
inquiry of several scientific experts with regard to the scientific conclusions upon which the EC's risk assessment was based. The Panel
explained that it relied on the majority scientific opinion where one
existed; and, where scientific views were divergent, it relied on the view
that "appeared, in our view, to be the most specific in relation to the
question at issue and to be best supported by arguments and evi166

US-Continued Suspension, supra note 2.
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dence."'1 67 The EC argued that the Panel applied an improper standard
of review under Art. 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, seeking to determine
"what the correct scientific conclusions are" rather than simply assessing
whether there was a sufficient scientific basis for the EC's conclusions in
its risk assessment.' 68 The Appellate Body stated, "the review power of a
panel is not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a
WTO member is correct, but rather to determine whether that risk
assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific
evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable."' 6 9 The Appellate
Body noted that a WTO member is entitled to rely on divergent or
minority views,
as long as those views come from a "respected and quali170
fied source.'

Following the ruling in US-Continued Suspension, making framing
decisions transparent in WTO challenges could further enhance consideration of the sovereign prerogatives of Member nations, while still being
subject to review to determine whether there is a "sufficient scientific
basis" for the SPS measure considering the unique costs and benefits for
that nation, and the framing decisions made in light of those challenges.
This standard offers equal respect to the sovereignty of both exporting
and importing nations, while still requiring that any trade-restricting SPS
measures be consistent with scientific evidence. In fact, greater transparency of first-order framing decisions might enhance the scientific
soundness of technology import regulations. If importing nations can
demonstrate that the framing decisions of the exporting nation are inconsistent with sound science, those first-order risk assessments would lose
the presumption of soundness they carry by virtue of their role in placing
the products in the stream of international commerce in the first place.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Making the value judgments and assumptions employed in first-order
risk assessments explicit would help to bolster the WTO's legitimacy as
an institution that harmonizes trade without abridging its member
nations' sovereignty. In the context of regulation of biotech products,
greater transparency would lend legitimacy on two levels. First, if framing decisions of first-order risk assessments were subject to WTO scrutiny, biotech-producing and -exporting nations like the U.S. would likely
begin to examine those decisions with more transparency when setting
biotech regulatory policy and conducting risk assessments. This increased
transparency would increase opportunity for democratic decision making
in the producing/exporting country, lending greater democratic credibility
167 Id.

T 596.

169

Id. 585.
Id. T 590.

170

Id. T 591 (citing Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 2, %194).
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to the first-order risk assessments that may ultimately be examined in a
WTO dispute.
The democratic legitimacy of first-order risk assessments is neither
given nor moot: even within the producing/exporting nation, the particular context and attendant value judgments may change over time. For
example, the political culture that influenced the development of the
Final Statement of Scope favored limited government regulations and
robust trust of industry and the free market. Recently, the collapse of the
financial services industry has altered the U.S. political climate, leading to
calls for greater government regulation of business and to the election of
Democrats to the White House and majorities of both branches of Congress. This altered political climate, skeptical of the limited-regulation
view prevalent at the time of the Final Statement of Scope, calls into
question whether the framing decisions made in and before 1992 are still
those that U.S. society would choose to frame decisions about risk assessment. Indeed, this shift has already begun to show in the context of
biotech regulation: in October 2008, the USDA, without publication of an
EIS, issued a proposed regulation that would further reduce APHIS oversight of biotech plants. 7 ' After President Obama's election, the USDA
extended the comment period and, in April 2009, held a public hearing
on the proposed regulation.' 7 2 As framing decisions for risk assessment
change based on changing economic, legal, cultural, social, and environmental values, the legitimacy of the risk assessment in both domestic
politics and international trade disputes may be enhanced if those framing decisions are transparent and open to public debate.
The Geertson and Center for Food Safety cases, and APHIS' reconsideration of the proposed biotech regulations, suggest that the U.S. may be
moving toward greater transparency in biotech policy and risk assessment. This is good news for advocates of SPS restrictions on biotech
imports from the U.S. While the WTO provides a forum for adjudicating
disputes over trade in biotech products, the reality of biotech contamination means that it is much more practical to regulate biotechnology at the
production/export end of the chain than at the import end, after the products are already in the stream of international commerce. The U.S. may
have begun to move away from the one-size-fits-all presumption of "subImportation, Interstate Movement, and Release into the Environment of
Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,008 (Oct. 9, 2008) (to be
codified at 7 C.F.R. §340).
171

172 Importation, Interstate Movement, and Release into the Environment of
Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 74 Fed. Reg. 2907 (Jan. 16, 2009)
(extending comment period to Mar. 17, 2009); Importation, Interstate Movement, and
Release into the Environment of Certain Genetically Engineered Organisms, 74 Fed.
Reg. 10,517 (Mar. 11, 2009) (announcing Apr. 2009 hearing and extending comment
period to June 2009). As of August 2009, the agency has not yet taken any final action
on the proposed regulation.
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stantial equivalence" between biotech products and their unmodified
counterparts and instead to focus on the characteristics of the particular
biotech product (e.g., alfalfa that bees can pollinate up to two miles from
the pollen source), the particular use in question (e.g., complete deregulation of field planting), and the particular risk prompting potential regulation (e.g., the loss of non-biotech alfalfa through contamination in the
field). If U.S. policy begins to move toward more case-specific risk
assessment, with express consideration and debate of the characteristics,
uses and risks, it is likely that U.S. biotech policy will move toward a
more precautionary approach toward biotech regulation, at least in the
case of some of the more predictable risks of biotech products (such as
contamination of non-biotech counterparts). For importing countries,
greater precaution on the exporting end may alleviate the need for stringent SPS measures on the importing end: it is easier to track and control
products that are already tracked and controlled at their source.
The second legitimacy advantage of "naming the framing" in first-order
risk assessments occurs when a trade dispute occurs. Importing countries
may argue to the WTO that both risk assessments - its own and that of
the producing/exporting country - are influenced not only by scientific
evidence but by the value judgments and assumptions made by the risk
assessors. Instead of looking for "sufficient scientific evidence" supporting the importing country's risk assessment in the abstract, this argument
urges the WTO to consider whether the existing state of scientific knowledge, framed by country-specific economic, legal, cultural,social, and environmental factors, supports the importing country's (trade-restricting)
risk assessment at least to the same degree as the exporting-country's
(production-generating) risk assessment. This standard still requires
importing countries to justify SPS measures based on sound scientific evidence, but it unseats the presumption favoring the exporting country's
situation-specific values and assumptions that occur when framing decisions are not transparent.

